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What Do We Know About the Dividend Puzzle? – A Literature Survey 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper aims to shed light on the ongoing debate of dividend policy, which is considered 
one of the most controversial topics in corporate finance literature. We, first, outline the main 
theoretical arguments of dividend policy and then critically discuss the most important and 
influential previous empirical studies in the dividend literature. We detect that no general 
consensus has yet been reached after many decades of investigation, despite extensive 
debate and countless research. Consequently, the main motivation for paying dividends is 
still unsolved and thus remains as a puzzle. In addition, there is no doubt that carrying the 
dividend debate into the context of emerging markets attaches more pieces to this puzzle. 
JEL Classification: G35 
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1. Introduction  
Dividend policy is one of the most controversial topics in corporate finance literature. The 
debate of dividend policy has attracted a great deal of attention from finance academics and 
has been the subject to intensive theoretical modelling and voluminous empirical research – 
for instance, some researchers have developed and empirically tested various models to 
explain why companies pay dividends (e.g., Lintner, 1956; Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 
1970; Rozeff, 1982), whereas others have surveyed corporate managers to learn their  
thoughts in explaining dividend behaviour (e.g., Baker et al., 1985, 2002, 2008; Pruitt and 
Gitman, 1991; Brav et al., 2005). However, despite much research and extensive debate, 
the actual motivation for paying dividends still remains unsolved. 
Black (1976, p.5) once described this lack of consensus as the “dividend puzzle” and 
stated that “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with 
pieces that just don’t fit together”. Although Black (1976) came to this conclusion four 
decades ago, his observation still seems valid as there is no definite theory on dividends. In 
the same vein, Brealey and Myers (2003) list dividends as one of the ten important unsolved 
problems in finance in their textbook. Additionally, the leading dividend policy theories are 
originally formulated based on developed markets and majority of earlier empirical research 
on dividend policy is focused mainly on the U.S., followed by the U.K. Therefore, less is 
known about dividend behaviour and the explanatory power of models for other countries, 
particularly developing (emerging) markets. Considering the growing importance of emerging 
markets in terms of global equity investments, these markets have recently started attracting 
considerable attention from international investors. Especially during the last two decades, a 
growing amount of empirical studies (such as, Glen et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; 
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Aivazian et al., 2003) investigate dividend policy in developing countries, and hence 
emerging markets add more pieces to the dividend puzzle.  
In this paper, we, therefore, offer a literature review by outlining the main theories 
and explanations of dividend policy, and presenting results from the most influential 
empirical studies in the dividend literature. This because, various opposing theoretical 
standing points and implications of dividend payments motivate us to shed light on the 
leading theoretical arguments and empirical findings and their contradictory conclusions in 
order to identify whether divided policy is still a puzzle after many decades of the ongoing 
research. Moreover, this paper differs from previous literature review studies (see, for among 
others, Lease et al., 2000; Frankfurter and Wood, 2003; Al-Malkawi et al., 2010) by 
incorporating empirical evidence related to dividend policy in the context of many different 
emerging markets. Accordingly, the study attempts to provide an updated and more 
comprehensive literature survey by examining the relationship between theory and practice 
from both developed and emerging economies, which is vital to detect new insights for 
paying dividends and to make suggestions for further research on this topic.  
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 outlines the main 
dividend theories, whereas Section 3 reviews the selective empirical research on dividend 
policy from both developed and developing markets.  Section 4 presents what we learn 
about dividend policy from our detailed literature survey and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Dividend Policy Theories  
Although dividend policy literature contains many explanations, some of them have been 
widely discussed and empirically tested in the hope of solving dividend puzzle. Thus, we will 
discuss major dividend policy theories in this section. Essentially, three main contradictory 
concepts can be observed in the literature. The first one is Miller and Modigliani (M&M)’s 
(1961) “dividend irrelevance theory”, which posits that a managed dividend policy is 
irrelevant under the assumptions of a perfect capital market (that is, dividend payments have 
no effect on firm value and no dividend policy is superior to another in a frictionless world). 
This is because wealth of shareholders is determined by the income generated by the 
investment decisions that mangers make, not by how they distribute that income.1 
The second approach suggests that dividend payments can increase firm value and 
shareholder wealth. For instance, the “bird-in-the-hand hypothesis” is a frequently heard 
argument that favours dividends. This hypothesis contends that since dividend payments are 
less risky than capital gains, dividend paying firms bring forward cash inflows to 
shareholders and reduce the uncertainty associated with future cash flows. Considering two 
identical firms, where one pays dividends while the other does not, the shares of the 
dividend paying firm will be safer than the shares of the non-dividend-paying firm, which in 
turn will increase the share price of the dividend paying firm.  as compared to the non-
dividend-paying firm. Accordingly, firms should offer higher dividend payouts in order to 
maximise their share prices and thus enhance their firm values (Gordon, 1959; 1963; 
Gordon and Shapiro, 1956).  
“Signalling theory” is one of the most widely studied explanations, arguing that an 
information asymmetry exists in where a firm’s management has a better understanding of 
the firm’s true value as compared to outside investors, who only have access to public 
                                                          
1
 The proof of M&M’s dividend irrelevance proposition is illustrated in Appendix A. 
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information. Therefore, managers use dividends to convey their superior information about 
the current situation and future prospects of their firms.  According to Bhattacharya (1979), 
John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985), if managers are confident about the 
future performance of their firms, they distribute more cash dividends to shareholders as a 
credible signal, whereas other firms, whose future prospects are not as good, cannot mimic 
the dividend payment levels of their firms. Hence, investors prefer to buy the shares of firms 
distributing larger dividends at higher share prices. Contrarily, firms with no or less 
favourable inside information (in other words, non-dividend paying firms) should experience 
negative price reactions. In his pioneering study, Lintner (1956) finds that managers are 
concerned about dividend signalling over time and suggests that managers are reluctant to 
cut dividends unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist, since they think dividend 
cuts are bad signals to the market. Lintner (1956) further detects that managers tend to 
make “partial adjustment” toward a target payout ratio to “smooth” dividend payment streams 
in the short run, and to avoid the volatility of dividends – because, managers perceive that 
the volatile (unstable) dividend payment streams reflect the volatility in earnings that are not 
good indicators about their firms’ financial performance to the market. 
Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984) and 
Jensen (1986) developed “agency cost theory”, which derives from problems associated with 
the separation of management and ownership, and the differences in managerial and 
shareholder priorities. They argue that high dividend payments decrease the internal cash 
flow subject to management discretion and force companies to approach the capital market 
in order to meet the funding needs for new projects. Increase of costly outside capital 
subjects to companies to the scrutiny of the capital market for new funds and decreases the 
scope of overinvestment. The efficient monitoring of capital market (that is, outside 
professionals such as investment banks, regulators, lawyers, public accountants and 
potential investors) also assists to ensure that managers perform in the best interests of 
shareholders. Consequently, agency cost theory implies that firms with high cash flows 
should pay larger dividends, because a generous dividend payment reduces the amount of 
free cash flow under management’s control and minimises the agency problems, and thus 
enhances firm value.  
Alternatively, there is the third position that claims dividend payments can have 
negative consequences on firm value and shareholders wealth. For example, in the 
presence of the uneven tax treatment between dividends and capital gains, the “tax 
preference theory”, developed by Brennan (1970), Elton and Gruber (1970) and Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979), asserts that investors who receive favourable tax treatment on 
capital gains may prefer shares with none or low dividend payouts. The reason is that if 
income tax is greater than the rate of capital gains tax, high dividend payments would 
increase shareholders’ tax burden. Therefore, other things being equal, firms should avoid or 
make minimal dividend payments if they want to maximise their share prices. On the other 
hand, Black and Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes (1978) proposed the “tax clientele 
effect hypothesis”, arguing that each investor has his/her own implied calculations of 
choosing between high or low cash dividends and selecting dividend policies according to 
their tax category circumstances. Since there are enough companies to provide these 
different dividend policies, investors will invest in only companies with policies that best fit 
their tax positions. In equilibrium, therefore, no firm can increase its value by reducing taxes 
through its dividend policy. In fact, this may cause a change in clientele and could be costly 
because of trading costs. Consequently, the tax clientele effect hypothesis supports the 
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dividend irrelevancy conclusion. Moreover, the “transaction cost theory” of dividends 
indicates that after using cheap and easily accessible internal funds to pay dividends instead 
of retaining for possible investment projects, firms may have to raise additional external 
funds to meet their investment requirements. This external financing might be costly, since 
there are costs associated with raising external funds, such as interest payments, 
underwriter fees, administration costs, management time and legal expenses. Hence, the 
transaction cost theory points out that, after paying dividends, firms may face heavy burden 
of transaction costs of external financing for possible investment projects (Bhattacharya, 
1979; Rozeff, 1982; Miller and Rock, 1985).   
Dividend debate is not limited to these three opposing arguments, since there are 
other theories that add more complexity to the dividend puzzle. Among those, the “pecking 
order theory”, developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), which posits that 
firms should adjust their dividend policies to their investment opportunities. This theory 
argues that firms seeking to finance new investments prefer to use funds according to a 
hierarchy; first internal funds, then debt issuance and finally equity issuance as a last resort. 
Accordingly, better firms should have lower leverage2 and lower short-term payout policies to 
control investment opportunities. Hence, in order to prevent external financing and make 
more use of internal funds for possible investments, one obvious way to accomplish this is 
by reducing the amounts of dividends distributed to shareholders. Furthermore, a relatively 
new explanation, namely the “catering theory of dividends” offered by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a; 2004b), postulates that investor preferences for dividends may change over time. 
Therefore, managers should recognise and cater to shifts in investors preferences for 
dividends – that is, managers cater to investors by distributing dividends when investors put 
a premium on such stocks and they will omit dividends when investors highly rate firms that 
do not pay dividends. Consequently, the theory suggests that dividends are highly relevant 
to share value but in different directions at different times.  
Grullon et al. (2002) purpose another explanation that attempts to link firm age with 
dividend policy, which is known as the “maturity hypothesis”. This explanation suggests that 
higher dividend increases are a sign of change in a firm’s life cycle. In particular, firms are 
likely to pay higher dividends as they transit from growth to a more mature phase. This 
change occurs because their investment opportunities and growth rates become slower or 
even decline, and they start generating larger amounts of free cash flows. Finally, the 
“residual dividend policy” recommends that firms should pay dividends only when their 
internally generated earnings are not fully exhausted for investment projects. Thus, dividend 
payments should ideally be the residuals of cash produced by the firms’ operations after 
undertaking all positive net present value (NPV) investments. Following a residual dividend 
policy, the amount of residual dividend tends to be highly volatile and often zero (Lease et 
al., 2000).  
After all, we observe that the major dividend policy theories are involved with the 
relaxation of Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) perfect capital market assumptions and dealt with 
dividends in the presence of various market imperfections (e.g., differential tax rates, 
information asymmetries, agency problems and transaction costs). However, these theories 
provide inconclusive or even contradictory explanations with respect to dividends. Thus, it 
                                                          
2
 If firms, however, experience high growth opportunities, they may have high leverage (given that 
investment requires more than the internally generated funds) and therefore these firms should pay 
out none or very low dividends (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
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can be concluded that none of these theories explain the dividend puzzle single-handedly, 
consistent with Frankfurter and Wood’s (2003, p.167) statement that “No theory based on 
the economic paradigm developed thus far completely explains the persistence of corporate 
dividend policy”. The major reason for this failure might  be because financial economists 
have been trying hard to develop a universal or “one-size-fits-all” approach, despite the well-
known reality that dividend policy may be sensitive to such aspects as firm characteristics, 
corporate governance and legal environment (Baker et al., 2008).  
Since there is no single theory to explain the dividend puzzle alone, researchers 
have attempted to seek an integrated model that combines various theories in examining 
dividend behaviour for the best explanation of corporate dividend policy. At this point, it is 
worth reviewing how these main dividend theories are empirically tested, and what 
implications there are by applying them on different markets, during different period of times, 
using different methodologies by many researchers. Therefore, we will present a summary of 
selective empirical studies from both developed and developing markets in the following 
section. 
3. Empirical Studies of Dividend Policy 
Although empirical research involving dividend policy is voluminous and continuously grows, 
the main empirical studies generally focus on the three big imperfections (Lease et al., 2000) 
– namely, the signalling and agency cost theories, and tax-related explanations. Since it is 
not possible to provide a full review of all literature, we, therefore, select and discuss the 
most important and influential empirical studies in dividend policy around these three main 
theories.  
3.1 Empirical studies of the signalling theory  
We classify the following selective review of empirical research on the signalling explanation 
into two sub-sections: (i) studies of the partial adjustment model and (ii) studies of the 
information content of dividends hypothesis. 
3.1.1 Studies of the partial adjustment model  
In his classic study, Lintner (1956) presents survey evidence that U.S. managers adopt 
extremely deliberate dividend policies, contrary to the dividend irrelevance theory. Lintner 
finds that managers set cash dividend payments in accordance with earnings and lagged 
dividends – they make partial adjustments to a target payout ratio to smooth dividend 
payments streams in the short-run, rather than matching immediately with the changes in 
earnings, hence pursue stable dividend policies. Lintner further detects that U.S. managers 
only increase dividend payments when they believe that earnings can sustain higher 
dividend levels permanently. They are also reluctant to cut dividends, unless adverse 
circumstances are likely to persist, as dividend cuts are bad signals to the market.  
Based on his survey research, Lintner develops a partial adjustment model to explain 
the dividend payment process. He suggests that firms have their target dividend levels, 
which they determine according to their earnings and target payout ratios in a particular 
year, as below: 
  D*
i,t
 = r
i
 E
i,t 
,                                                                (1) 
where D*
i,t
 is the target dividend payment, r
i  
is the target payout ratio and E
i,t
 is the 
net earnings for firm i at time t. Lintner argues that firms will only adjust dividends partially 
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toward the target dividend level; hence, the actual difference in dividend payments from year 
t−1 to year t can be expressed by:  
D
i,t  
− D
i,t−1 
= α
i  
+ c
i 
(D*
i,t 
− D
i,t−1
) + ε
i,t
 ,                                           (2) 
where α
i
 is the intercept term, c
i
 is the speed of adjustment coefficient, ε
i,t
 is the error 
term, D
i,t 
is the actual dividend payment and D
i,t−1 
is the previous year’s (t−1) dividend 
payment. By substituting r
i
 E
i,t 
for the target dividend payment D*
i,t 
in the model and 
rearranging Equation (2), the following equation can be equivalently obtained:  
 D
i,t 
= α
i  
+ β
1
E
i,t 
+ β
2
D
i,t−1 
+ ε
i,t
 ,                                                  (3) 
where β
1 
= c
i 
r
i
 and β
2 
= (1−c
i
). According to Lintner (1956), the constant (intercept) 
term (α
i
) should be positive to show management’s unwillingness to decrease dividends, and 
the speed of adjustment coefficient (c
i
) reflects the stability in dividend changes and 
calculates the adjustment speed toward the target payout ratio (r
i
) relative to earnings 
changes. Hence, the value c
i
 illustrates the dividend smoothing behaviour of firm i to the 
variations in the earnings levels – that is, a higher value of c
i
 implies less dividend 
smoothing, in other words unstable dividend policy, and vice-versa.  
Many studies have used Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model to examine the 
stability of dividends in different countries (both developed and developing markets) at 
different periods of time. For instance, Darling (1957) is among first scholars who extend the 
Lintner model. He runs a number of multiple regression tests on an annual dataset of 
manufacturing U.S. firms and reports consistent results with Lintner’s findings. Fama and 
Babiak (1968) test several specifications of the partial adjustment model on the firm-level 
data for U.S. industrial firms, rather than aggregate data. Their results show that the Lintner 
model also works well on individual firm-level dataset. Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
compare dividend policies of U.S. and Japanese firms and present evidence that supports 
the notion of Lintner’s speed of adjustment – they find that U.S. dividends are much 
smoother than before and Japanese firms cut dividends in response to poor performance 
more quickly than U.S. firms. McDonald et al.’s (1975) estimates from the basic and modified 
Lintner models show that dividend payments of French firms are well explained by earnings 
and past dividends in the dividend model of Lintner. Similarly, Chateau (1979) tests the 
partial adjustment model, using alternative economic procedures, and reports that Lintner’s 
explanation of dividend behaviour works well in Canada. 
Survey researchers have taken another path to study dividend policy. Instead of 
using secondary (published) data, they have provided direct evidence from corporate 
managers by asking their perception about dividends (Baker et al., 2002). For example, 
Baker et al. (1985) find that the major determinants of dividend policy decisions still appear 
markedly similar to Lintner’s findings. Pruitt and Gitman’s (1991) survey findings show that 
current year earnings and lagged dividends are the major factors affecting current year 
dividend payments. Likewise, Baker et al.’s (2002) results are strongly consistent with 
Lintner’s proposition and stress the dividend continuity. In another study, Brav et al. (2005) 
also show support for Lintner’s behaviour model – especially, they indicate that one of 
Lintner’s key findings still holds; managers are reluctant to cut dividends and the current 
level of dividend payments is taken as given unless adverse circumstances are likely to 
persist. In addition to above surveys conducted in the U.S., a string of studies providing 
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survey evidence in different countries (from both developed and emerging markets), such as 
Baker et al. (2006) in Norway, Baker et al. (2008) in Canada, Baker and Powell (2012) in 
Indonesia, Baker and Kapoor (2015) in India and Baker et al. (2018) in Turkey, have all 
reported general support for Lintner’s partial adjustment model. 
Mookerjee’s (1992) research is one of the earliest studies that quantitatively apply 
the Lintner model to different developing markets. Mookerjee finds that the basic Lintner 
model works successfully in explaining dividend payment behaviour in India. However, 
Adaoglu (2000) reports that Turkish-listed firms do not smooth dividend payments, 
inconsistent with Lintner’s argument, and hence follow unstable dividend policies unlike their 
counterparts in developed markets. Contrarily, Pandey (2001) detects that Malaysian firms 
rely both on past dividends and current earnings in setting the current period’s dividend 
payments, but they have low smoothing and less stable dividend policies, compared to 
listed-firms in developed markets. Aivazian et al. (2003) compare the dividend behaviour of 
firms operating in eight different developing countries with the dividend policies of a control 
sample of U.S. firms. They report that the Lintner model still works well for U.S. firms, 
whereas it does not work that well for the emerging market companies. Al-Najjar (2009) finds 
that Jordanian firms have their target payout ratios and partially adjust dividends toward their 
targets, although relatively faster compared to U.S. companies. Further, Chemmanur et al. 
(2010) compare dividend policies of firms in Hong Kong and the U.S., and reveal that, 
compared to U.S. firms, Hong Kong firms follow a more flexible dividend policy 
commensurate with current year earnings. Most recently, Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2017) 
investigate the firm-level cash dividend behaviour of publicly listed firms in Turkey after the 
implementation of major reforms and significant regulatory changes regarding mandatory 
dividend payout rules starting with the fiscal year 2003. Unlike Adaoglu’s (2000) earlier 
findings, they find that Turkish-listed firms have long-term payout ratios and adjust their cash 
dividends by a moderate level of smoothing, as suggested by Lintner, and thus adopt stable 
dividend policies in the post-2003 period, although less stable policies compared to their 
U.S. counterparts. 
3.1.2 Studies of the information content of dividends hypothesis  
The information content of dividends hypothesis asserts that managers have prior inside 
information about their firms’ future performance. Hence, they use cash dividend 
announcements to convey changes in their expectations about future prospects of their firm 
to the public. Since dividend decisions are almost exclusively at managers’ prudence and if 
they are confident about the future performance of their firms, they distribute larger cash 
dividends as a good signal to investors. Conversely, dividend decreases are seen as a bad 
signal that managers anticipate permanently lower cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979; John 
and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Aharony and Swary (1980) examine quarterly dividend announcements that follow 
and that precede quarterly earnings announcements. They find that firms those announced 
dividend increases realise positive abnormal returns; especially, most of the significant 
abnormal returns occur during the dividend announcement and dividend declaration dates 
(two-day excess return) for both groups whether earnings announcements precede or follow 
dividend announcements (0.72% and 1.03%, respectively). A mirror argument applies to 
dividend decreases with two-day excess returns of −3.76% and −2.82%, respectively – 
noticeably, abnormal returns for the dividend decreases are much greater than those of 
dividend increases. Aharony and Swary conclude that changes in quarterly cash dividends 
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provide information beyond that provided by corresponding quarterly earning numbers. 
Healy and Palepu (1988) investigate the market reaction to dividend initiation and omission 
announcements. Their results exhibit that the mean two-day excess return of 3.9% for 
initiations and −9.5% for omissions. The results further show that there are significant 
earnings increases for as many as five years prior to, for the year of and two years following 
a dividend initiation, whereas dividend-omitting firms have earnings decreases for two years 
prior to and in the year of the dividend omission announcements. Healy and Palepu suggest 
that dividend initiation and omission announcements appear to convey incremental 
information about firms’ future earnings performance.  
Michaely et al. (1995) also study both the short-term and long-term effects of 
dividend initiation and omission announcements. Consistent with Healy and Palepu, they 
find that omission announcements lead to a mean price drop of about 7%, whereas 
initiations yield a mean price increase of over 3% in the short-run. They further report quite 
consistent long-term drift patterns, which show that omissions are associated with negative, 
while initiations are associated with positive excess returns. However, Benartzi et al. (1997) 
reveal that there is a strong past and concurrent link between earnings and dividend 
changes, and therefore reject the hypothesis that changes in dividends signal information 
about future earnings changes. Jensen and Johnson (1995) specifically concentrate on 
dividend drop announcements instead of dividend changes. Their analysis shows that the 
dividend cuts tend to signal the beginning of restructuring activities and turnaround in 
financial decline, leading to improvement in liquidity positions and reduction in the level of 
debt. Accordingly, they suggest that dividend reductions do not necessarily signal a decline 
in earnings.  
Akhigbe and Madura (1996) present evidence in favour of the information content of 
dividends hypothesis; that is, firms have positive long-term share price performance after 
dividend initiations, whereas firms omitting dividends experience unfavourable price 
performance in the long-run. DeAngelo et al. (1996) investigate whether firms use dividends 
to signal their views of future earnings prospects by focusing on firms whose annual 
earnings suddenly declined after nine or more consecutive years of a stable growth. Their 
results offer no support for the argument that dividend increases in the year of downturn are 
useful devices of improved future earnings performance. Contrarily, Lipson et al. (1998) 
study the performance of newly public firms that initiated dividends and those that did not, 
and they find support for dividend signalling since only the initiating firms have favourable 
earnings surprises in the first and second year following the dividend initiations.  
Furthermore, Altiok-Yilmaz and Akben-Selcuk (2010) analyse the market price 
reaction to dividend announcements in the Turkish stock market. They report that the market 
reacts positively to dividend increases and negatively to dividend decreases, whereas it 
does not react when dividends are not changed, consistent with the information content of 
dividends hypothesis. Dasilas and Leventis (2011) examine the market stock price and 
trading volume responses to cash dividend distribution announcements in the Athens Stock 
Exchange. They also show support for the information content of dividends hypothesis, 
revealing that there is a statistically significant market reaction on the dividend 
announcement day. Al-Yahyaee et al. (2011) provide more evidence in favour of the 
argument that cash dividend announcements convey information to the market from the 
Muscat Securities Market; that is, announcements of dividend increases (decreases) involve 
10 
 
with increased (decreased) stock prices, while firms that do not change their dividend 
payments experience insignificant negative stock returns.  
Fairchild et al. (2014) analyse dividend changes in the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
and report no significant relation between dividend changes (either increases or decreases) 
and future profitability changes. Instead, they find that dividend changes are functions of a 
firm’s past and current financial performance. Liu and Chen (2015) retest the dividend 
signalling, arguing that managers change dividends to convey their expectation of future 
equity-scaled earnings performance. However, their results show that dividend changes 
have no significant ability to predict equity-scaled earnings changes, which are subject to 
firm capital structure decisions, due to the noise induced by the motives other than the 
prospects of signalling. Liu and Chen (2015) conclude that if investors constantly cannot 
recognise the signalling purpose and do not consider dividend changes useful devices in 
predicting future earnings prospects, managers may at some point stop using dividend 
changes to signal their asymmetric information about firm earnings performances.  
Table 1 summarises the empirical studies of the signalling theory of dividends that 
are reviewed here. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
3.2 Empirical studies of the agency cost theory 
We classify the following selective review of empirical research on the agency cost theory 
into three sub-sections: (i) studies of the principal-agent conflict, (ii) studies of the principal-
principal conflict, and (iii) studies of the shareholder-bondholder conflict. 
3.2.1 Studies of the principal-agent conflict 
Berle and Means (1932) draw attention to the prevalence of widely held corporations in 
which ownership structure of firms is dispersed among small shareholders but the control is 
concentrated in the hands of managers. The Berle and Means widely held corporation is 
extensively accepted in the finance literature as a common organisational form for large 
firms in the richest common law countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and Australia. 
Hence, one of the most studied explanations for why firms pay dividends is the agency cost 
motive, which derives from the problems associated with the separation of management (the 
agent) and ownership (the principal), and the differences in managerial and shareholder 
priorities, also known as the “principal-agent conflict” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
explanation argues that cash dividends can be used to mitigate agency problems in a 
company by reducing free cash flows and forcing management to enter the capital market 
for financing, hence leading to induce monitoring by the market (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986). 
The function of dividends as a monitoring mechanism of managerial activities is 
grounded by Easterbrook (1984), who argues that dividends play a role in controlling agency 
related problems by facilitating primary capital market monitoring on firms’ activities and 
performance, since dividend payments force firms to raise capital more often in capital 
markets. However, the dividend-induced monitoring for shareholders may not be costless, 
such as tax burden or issuance costs. Therefore, Easterbrook also indicates alternative non-
dividend monitoring devices for controlling agency cost (e.g., high growth opportunities or 
large shareholders). Crutchley and Hansen (1989) provide support for the monitoring 
rationale for dividends and the simultaneity of financial policies (e.g., dividends, leverage 
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policy and managerial ownership) in controlling the agency cost in a most efficient way. Born 
and Rimbey (1993) examine the shareholder responses to firms that initiated or resumed a 
cash dividend policy. Their findings present that firms that announce both capital financing 
and dividend increases enjoy higher abnormal returns than firms that announce dividend 
increases alone, which is consistent with Easterbrook’s capital market monitoring rationale. 
Hansen et al. (1994) present evidence that U.S. regulated electric utilities use dividend-
induced monitoring for controlling agency problems. Noronha et al. (1996) find that the 
monitoring role of dividends and the simultaneity between capital structure and dividend 
decisions are dependent on specific firm characteristics – particularly, the dividend decisions 
of firms with less alternative non-dividend devices (i.e., the incentive-based managerial 
compensation and the existence of a large shareholder) and low growth are made in line 
with Easterbrook’s monitoring explanation, whereas firms with alternative mechanisms and 
high growth are not likely to use dividends to control agency problems, and no interaction 
between dividend and capital structure decisions is observed in such firms. 
Moreover, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis posits that managers with large 
amount of excess cash (free cash flow) may act in ways not in shareholders’ best interests. 
Instead of undertaking positive NPV investment projects by this cash, they might overinvest 
by accepting marginal investment projects with negative NPVs. Hence, substantial cash 
dividend payments would lessen the amount of free cash flow that managers may misuse 
and therefore reduce the scope of overinvestment. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) follow 
Jensen’s free cash flow argument and call the extended form “the overinvestment 
hypothesis”. They argue that overinvesting firms experience positive abnormal stock returns, 
following a substantial increase in dividends. This is because the market anticipates this 
action as a reduction in the overinvestment problem (a good indicator), since increased 
dividends decrease the amount of cash than would have been otherwise invested in 
suboptimal projects. Contrarily, substantial dividend decreases suggest that the potential for 
the overinvestment problem may have increased (a bad indicator).3 Furthermore, Agrawal 
and Jayaraman (1994) find that dividends, debt and managerial ownership are served as 
alternative mechanisms to reduce the possible corruption related to the agency cost of free 
cash flow. Similarly, Johnson’s (1995) empirical results also show that debt and dividends 
are substitutes for reducing agency costs of free cash flows.  
Rozeff (1982) supports the role of dividends in reducing agency costs but also 
indicates that a more generous dividend policy leads a firm to raise external finance that 
might be associated with increased transaction costs. Accordingly, Rozeff develops the cost 
minimisation model, which combines transaction costs and agency costs to an optimal 
dividend policy, as illustrated below:  
PAY = α − β1INS − β2GROW1 − β3GROW2 − β4BETA + β5STOCK + Ɛ,                  
(4) 
                                                          
3
 Lang and Litzenberger use Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) as a proxy for investment opportunity to 
distinguish between overinvesting and value-maximising firms. They assume that a firm with a Q ratio 
which exceeds 1 is a value-maximizing firm, because the market value reflects the book value plus 
the positive NPV of the investment. Using the same rationale, a firm with a Q ratio is less than 1 
indicates overinvestment, where managers of those firms are involved in substantial free cash flows 
invested in negative NPV projects. 
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where PAY is the dividend payout ratio, INS is the percentage of stock owned by 
insiders, GROW1 is the past growth rate of revenues, GROW2 is the forecasted growth rate 
of revenues, BETA is the beta coefficient of returns, and STOCK is the natural logarithm of 
the number of common shareholders.4 Rozeff tests his cost minimisation model on a large 
sample of U.S. firms and reports that the model works well in explaining the cross-sectional 
variability in payout ratio across firms.  
Lloyd et al.’s (1985) research is one of the first studies to replicate and expand the 
work of Rozeff. They present credibility to the cost minimisation model and reveal that firm 
size is also an important explanatory variable that has a positive impact on the payout ratio. 
Likewise, Schooley and Barney (1994) provide support to the Rozeff model but find that the 
relationship between the percentage of insider ownership and dividend policy is non-
monotonic. Moh’d et al. (1995) apply a number of changes to both the method and proxy 
variables used in the original cost minimisation model. Their results show that firms appear 
to adjust dividend payout in response to the agency cost/transaction cost structure, 
consistent with Rozeff’s original findings; more importantly, this relationship holds not only 
across firms but through time as well. Farinha (2003) reports that, consistent with Schooley 
and Barney, there is a strong U-shaped relationship between dividend payouts and insider 
ownership in the British market. The study, also, reports strong evidence for a significant and 
positive impact of common shareholder dispersion on dividend payouts, in line with the 
existing agency cost literature. 
3.2.2 Studies of the principal-principal conflict  
A number of well-known cross-country studies (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 1999; Faccio et al., 2001) present that concentrated ownership structures by large 
controlling shareholders (typically, families or the state) are the dominant form in most 
developing countries. Accordingly, the agency cost problems may function differently in 
highly concentrated publicly listed firms and prior findings based on the principal-agency 
conflict from widely held corporations in developed markets cannot readily generalise into 
the context of developing markets (Daily et al., 2003). 
It is argued that large shareholders have better incentives and ability to act as an 
effective monitoring mechanism on the management. Hence, the existence of such large 
shareholders can mitigate the free-rider problem of monitoring managers and consequently 
reduces agency problems associated with the principal-agent conflict (Grossman and Hart, 
1980; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). According to La Porta et al. (1999), family owners are 
almost always involved in the managements of their firms by occupying top managerial 
positions. Their direct involvement provides greater alignment between the interests of 
shareholders and managers. Family control is, therefore, one of the most efficient forms of 
organisational governance and may bring more effective supervision on management, which 
leads to zero or lower owner-manager agency problems, than other large shareholders or 
dispersed corporations.  
Nevertheless, large blockholders, especially families, increase the moral risks arising 
from the abuse of control rights and, when they hold almost full control, they tend to 
generate private benefits of control that are not shared with minority shareholders. In fact, 
many researchers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny,1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Morck and Yeung, 
                                                          
4
 Rozeff (1982) uses two proxies for agency costs in the model, which are INS and STOCK, and 
employs three variables to measure transaction costs; GROW1, GROW2 and BETA, respectively. 
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2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) argue that family owners might have increased access to 
the use of corporate funds and powerful incentives to expropriate wealth from minority 
investors, due to the absence of efficient monitoring and the lack of appropriate legal 
shareholder protection, transparency and disclosure practices. In these cases, the salient 
agency problem is, therefore, expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the 
controlling shareholders, which is the conflict between large blockholders (the principal) and 
minority shareholders (the principal), in other words the “principal-principal conflict”.  
La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that corporate law can provide outside investors and 
existing shareholders specific powers to protect their wealth against expropriation. They 
further argue that cash dividends can be also used to reduce the principal-principal conflict 
by guarantying a pro-rata payout to entire shareholders and removing corporate wealth from 
controlling shareholders. Accordingly, La Porta et al. propose two alternative agency models 
based on the legal environment and dividends, namely the “outcome model” and “substitute 
model”.5 They collect a cross-country sample from 33 countries that allows to compare 
dividend policies of companies whose minority shareholders face different risks of 
expropriation by corporate insiders across different countries under different legal systems. 
Their empirical results show that firms operating in countries with better protection of 
minority shareholders pay higher dividends, consistent with the outcome agency model of 
dividends. Also, in these economies, fast growth firms distribute lower dividends than slow 
growth firms, in line with the argument that legally well-protected minority shareholders tend 
to wait for their dividends, when investment opportunities are good. However, in poorly 
protected countries, shareholders are more likely to take whatever dividends they can get, 
regardless of investment opportunities, suggesting that this apparent misallocation of 
investment is most probably part of the agency cost of poor legal protection.  
Having examined companies from five West European and nine East Asian 
countries, Faccio et al. (2001) find that family control is the predominant form of ownership 
both in East Asia and Western Europe. They report that the presence of multiple large 
shareholders increases dividend payouts in Western Europe but decreases dividend 
payments in East Asia. This suggests that other large owners tend to help reducing the 
controlling shareholder’s expropriation of minority owners in Europe, whereas they appear to 
exacerbate it in Asia. Furthermore, Manos (2002) shows that Indian firms set their dividend 
payout ratios so as to minimise the sum of agency costs and the costs associated with 
raising external finance, providing support for the Rozeff model and the agency rationale for 
paying dividends. Chen et al. (2005) find that, only for small firms, there is a significant 
negative correlation between dividend payout and family ownership of up to 10%, and a 
positive relation for family ownership between 10% and 35%, in Hong Kong. Hence, they 
interpret their findings as the fact that controlling families tend to extract resources in Hong 
Kong, but when their shareholdings increase, outside investors anticipate potential 
expropriation by families and demand higher dividends from firms with potentially the largest 
agency conflicts. Wei et al. (2011) report that family firms have lower dividend payouts and 
lower tendencies to pay dividends than non-family firms in China. In another study, Gonzalez 
et al. (2014) detect that family influence in relation to the level and likelihood of dividend 
payments differ considerably according to the type of family involvement in Colombia. More 
                                                          
5
 According to the outcome model, dividends are an “outcome” of an effective legal system, whereas 
the substitute model posits that dividends are “substitutes” for legal protection in the countries with 
poor shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 2000). 
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recently, Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) investigate the effects of family ownership, non-
family blockholders (i.e., foreign and domestic investors, and the state) and minority 
shareholders on dividend policy of listed firms traded in the Turkish stock exchange. Their 
empirical results indicate that all types of large shareholders and even minority owners have 
a negative impact on dividend payments. Hence, they suggest that cash dividends are not 
used as a monitoring mechanism by investors in Turkey and the expropriation argument 
through dividends for Turkish families is inconclusive. 
3.2.3 Studies of the shareholder-bondholder conflict  
The conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders is another type of agency 
problem related to dividends. This is because dividends can be potentially used to 
expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lease et 
al., 2000). Woolridge (1983) argues that if a firm finances an unexpected dividend 
distribution with additional debt or reducing investment, a wealth transfer between 
shareholders and bondholders may exist. This action could also reflect that managers aim to 
convey about their firms’ prospects to the market. Indeed, the wealth transfer and signalling 
effects of dividend policy are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is more likely that both 
effects are reflected in security prices, but one effect dominates the other. Accordingly, 
Woolridge studies the effects of unexpected dividend changes on the values of common 
stock, preferred stock and straight bonds related to the wealth transfer and information 
content hypotheses. The empirical findings reveal consistent evidence with both the wealth 
transfer and signalling hypotheses. However, their further tests show that the information 
content is the predominant hypothesis regarding unexpected dividend changes on security 
prices, rather than the wealth transfer.  
Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) investigate stock and bond price reactions to 
announcements of specially designated dividends (SDDs). They argue that unexpected or 
extra dividend payments, such as SDDs, may cause wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders by reducing the asset base of the firm. Their results indicate that share price 
reactions to SDDs are positive and statistically significant, whereas bond prices remain 
unaffected by such announcements. Consequently, their empirical evidence presents 
consistency with the information content hypothesis but provides no support for the wealth 
transfer hypothesis. Similarly, Long et al. (1994) report no evidence that firms manipulate 
dividend policy to expropriate wealth from new bondholders to shareholders. However, 
Dhillon and Johnson (1994) examine stock and bond reactions to dividend changes and find 
evidence that supports the wealth redistribution hypothesis, but they cannot still rule out the 
information content hypothesis completely. Further, Mathur et al. (2013) find that 
bondholders consider dividend payments in small amounts as a favourable signal about the 
future prospect of the firm, whereas they regard large dividend payments as a tendency to 
redistribute wealth in favour of shareholders. Tsai and Wu (2015) report that both premium 
bond and abnormal stock returns on dividend announcement dates are positively related to 
unexpected dividend changes and therefore suggest that the information content/free cash 
flow effect dominates the wealth transfer effect in the U.S. bond market.  
Table 2 summarises the empirical studies of the agency cost theory of dividends that 
are reviewed here.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
3.3 Empirical studies of the tax effect 
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We classify the following selective review of empirical research on the tax effect into two 
sub-sections: (i) studies of the relationship between dividend yields and risk-adjusted 
returns, and (ii) studies of the ex-dividend day share price behaviour. 
3.3.1 Studies of the relationship between dividend yields and risk-adjusted returns  
In order to determine the relationship between tax risk-adjusted returns and dividend yields, 
Brennan (1970) formulates an after-tax version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
which maintains that a security’s pre-tax excess return is linearly and positively related to its 
systematic risk and to its dividend yield. Brennan argues that if dividends are taxed at higher 
rates than capital gains, then higher pre-tax returns are associated with higher dividend yield 
securities, to pay off investors for the tax disadvantages of dividends. In such cases, 
investors, therefore, require higher pre-tax risk-adjusted returns on stocks with higher 
dividend yields to compensate for the tax disadvantages of these returns.  
However, Black and Scholes (1974) find that the expected returns on high-yield 
dividend stocks are not significantly different from the expected returns on low-yield dividend 
stocks either before or after taxes, indicating no relationship between these two. 
Consequently, Black and Scholes suggest that investors invest in companies with cash 
dividend policies suitable for their tax circumstances, consistent with the tax clientele 
hypothesis. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) challenge the results of Black and 
Scholes and they, in fact, find a strong positive correlation between pre-tax expected returns 
and dividend yields of common stocks. Hence, they interpret their results as support for 
Brennan’s model, suggesting that the positive dividend yield coefficient is the evidence of a 
dividend-tax effect. Nevertheless, Miller and Scholes (1982) raise objections to Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy’s conclusion and re-perform their tests. Miller and Scholes detect a non-
significant dividend yield coefficient and therefore deduce this evidence as inconsistent with 
the tax effect. They further attribute the Litzenber and Ramaswamy findings to information 
effect rather than the tax effect. To answer this criticism, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1982) re-examine their analysis by employing an alternative procedure, which is solely 
announcement effect-free, as they claim. Their results still support their previous findings – a 
significant and positive dividend yield coefficient, and hence provide strong support for the 
tax effect hypothesis.  
Blume (1980) also studies the relationship between dividend yields and risk-adjusted 
returns and finds a considerably more complicated relationship than what has been 
suggested by prior research. Thus, Blume concludes that the relation across stocks is far too 
complicated to be entirely explained by the tax effects. Poterba and Summers (1984) 
investigate tax effect in the U.K., since there had been some radical changes in the British 
tax regime. They find strong evidence that taxes affect the equilibrium relationship between 
dividend yields and returns. Hence, they suggest that taxes explain part of the positive 
relationship between yields and stock market returns. Moreover, Keim (1985) reports a 
significant non-linear relationship between dividend yields and stock returns as well as a 
significant effect of the month of January on this yield-return relationship. Hence, Keim (p. 
487) concludes that “[…] the observed relation between long-run dividend yields and stock 
returns may not be solely attributable to differences in marginal tax rates for dividends and 
capital gains.”  
Likewise, although Kalay and Michaely (2000) find a significant positive dividend 
yield coefficient, they state that the well-known tax models do not explain their evidence. 
Hence, they suggest that their empirical evidence is in some ways related to a more complex 
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tax effect theory, which is yet to be developed. Park and Kim (2010) present evidence that is 
inconsistent with the tax-effect hypothesis in Korea, and further suggest that non-tax reasons 
for the yield effect exist. More recently, Lemmon and Nguyen (2015) detect a significant 
positive relationship between dividend yield and risk-adjusted return in Hong Kong, where no 
taxes exist on either dividend income or capital gains. Hence, they suggest that this positive 
relationship cannot be explained by taxes alone, and also conclude that non-tax factors are 
associated with the relationship between dividend yields and returns. 
3.3.2 Studies of the ex-dividend day share behaviour  
Elton and Gruber (1970) provide another tax-based argument, claiming that the ex-dividend 
behaviour of a firm’s share prices should reflect the tax rates of its marginal long-term 
investors. They argue that a shareholder who sells shares before a share goes ex-dividend 
loses the right to the previously declared dividend. If he sells the share on the ex-dividend 
day, he maintains the dividend but should expect to sell it at a lower price because of this 
dividend retention. Accordingly, in a perfect market, the share price should drop by the full 
amount of the dividend on the ex-dividend day. However, if the tax rate on dividends 
exceeds that on capital gains, the share price on the ex-day should fall less than the amount 
of dividend. Consequently, one can infer the tax brackets of the marginal long-term investors 
from observing the ex-dividend day drop in share prices relative to dividends.  
Kalay (1982), however, criticises Elton and Gruber’s argument, claiming that 
equilibrium prices around the ex-dividend day tend to be determined, not only by the long-
term investors, but also by the short-term traders. He further proposes the “short-term 
trading hypothesis”, arguing that if the ex-dividend price drop is less than the dividend per 
share, it provides arbitrage profits for the short-term traders, who are tax-exempt or subject 
to the same tax rate on dividends and capital gains. Michaely (1991) studies share price 
behaviour around ex-dividend day, using the implementation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act in 
the U.S., which significantly reduces the difference of taxation on capital gains and dividends 
in 1987, and utterly eliminates the differential in 1988. Michaely finds that the tax law change 
has no effect on the ex-dividend share price behaviour. This means that a change in the 
long-term investors’ tax rates does not affect the ex-day prices, which is inconsistent with the 
tax clientele hypothesis but it implies that the activity of short-term traders determines the 
share price behaviour on the ex-day.  
Koski and Scruggs (1998) also report findings supporting the argument that tax-
neutral dealers engage in short-term trading for arbitrage profits, which eliminates the tax 
effect around ex-days. Contrarily, Kaplanis (1986) provides evidence in favour of the tax 
effect hypothesis but offers no support for the short-trading explanation. Furthermore, Lasfer 
(1995) investigates share price behaviour around the ex-dividend day before and after the 
implementation of the 1988 Income and Corporation Taxes Act in the U.K., which 
considerably decreases the tax differential between dividends and capital gains. He finds 
that ex-day returns are not affected by short-term trading but taxation affects significantly ex-
dividend day share price behaviour in the U.K. In a similar study, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) 
examine the impact of major changes introduced in the U.K. system of dividend taxation in 
July 1997. They show that the reform has an immediate impact on the largest investor class, 
namely pension funds, and that the valuation of dividend income differs significantly after the 
reform, especially for high-yielding firms. Thus, Bell and Jenkinson conclude that taxation 
affects the valuation of dividend income and pension funds are the effective marginal 
investors for high-yielding firms in the U.K.  
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Milonas et al. (2006) analyse the ex-dividend day stock price behaviour in China and 
they report overall findings consistent with the tax effect hypothesis. Rantapuska (2008) 
investigates the trading behaviour of investors around the ex-dividend days in Finland. The 
results show that investors with a preference for dividend income buy shares cum-dividend 
and sell ex-dividend, and vice-a-versa, consistent with the dynamic dividend clientele 
hypothesis. Also, investors involve with overnight arbitrage opportunities if transaction costs 
are low and dividend yield is high enough. Similarly, Tseng and Hu (2013) study the 
relationship between taxes and investor behaviour around ex-dividend days before and after 
the 1998 tax reform in Taiwan. They find that only domestic investors engaged in arbitrage 
opportunities before the reform but, after the reform, all investors (both domestic and foreign) 
aggressively act as short-term arbitrageurs around ex-dividend days. This is inconsistent 
with the argument that only tax-neutral investors play the role of arbitrageurs on the ex-day, 
but strongly support the dynamic dividend clientele hypothesis.  
Table 3 summarises the empirical studies of the tax effect on dividends that are 
reviewed here. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
4. So What Have We Learnt? 
As previously mentioned, the main empirical research of the dividend puzzle focuses on the 
three major imperfections (the asymmetric information, agency problems and taxes). After 
reviewing various empirical studies, we observe a number of important points.  
First, there is substantial empirical evidence supporting Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model of divided signalling explanation. This approach has been central to the 
dividend debate and still remained valid, after all those years, since 1956 when the original 
findings were presented. Specifically, firms believe in the stability of dividends, concerning 
that the market reacts favourably to dividend increases and unfavourably to decreases. 
Hence, they tend to prevent making changes in dividend rates that may have to be reversed 
in the future, and they are reluctant to cut dividends, unless adverse circumstances are likely 
to persist. Accordingly, current earnings and lagged dividends are the most crucial 
determinants of the current dividend levels. However, there has been no consensus 
achieved on the argument that dividend change announcements do necessarily signal about 
the future earnings changes of the firms. There is no strong evidence that announcements of 
dividend increases/decreases and initiations/omissions characteristically trigger an impact 
on future share prices in the same direction.  
Second, empirical studies related to agency problems in developed markets 
generally focus on the principal-agent conflict. In this respect, there is strong evidence in 
favour of the cost minimisation model, developed by Rozeff (1982). Similarly, there is 
evidence that dividends may play a role in controlling agency problems by facilitating primary 
capital market monitoring on firms’ activities and performance, as proposed by Easterbrook 
(1984). There is also evidence that dividends can be used as substitutes with other non-
dividend monitoring mechanisms, such as managerial ownership, leverage and growth. 
However, empirical evidence based on Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis is quite 
mixed. Since both agency cost of free cash flow and signalling hypothesis imply relatively 
similar effects on share prices, although many empirical studies showed support for the free 
cash flow hypothesis, they cannot completely rule out the cash flow signalling hypothesis. 
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Third, a number of cross-country studies show that concentrated ownership 
structures by large controlling shareholders are the dominant form of organisational form in 
most developing countries. Hence, agency cost theory of dividends needs to be uniquely 
investigated in developing markets, and, more importantly, the ownership structure of the 
firms in these markets should specifically be taken into account while identifying the proxies 
for agency cost variables. Indeed, the salient agency problem is the expropriation of the 
wealth of minority owners by the controlling shareholders (in other words, the principal-
principal conflict) in these economies. Fourth, there is not enough evidence that dividends 
are used to expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders. 
Finally, some researchers find that the existence of the clientele effect determines 
the ex-dividend day share prices, as the ex-dividend price drop should reflect the differential 
taxation between dividends and capital gains of the marginal investors. Alternatively, the 
short-term trading hypothesis challenges this point, arguing that in the presence of short-
term traders, such as tax-neutral dealers and corporate traders, the marginal tax rates of the 
investors cannot be inferred by observing the ex-day price drop. It is because short-term 
traders, who are seeking for arbitrage profits, will dominate the price setting on the ex-days; 
hence, eliminating the tax effect. In fact, empirical evidence involving the tax-related theories 
is completely inconclusive. 
5. Conclusions  
Although Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theory is logical and consistent 
under perfect capital market assumptions, once this idealised world is left and we return to 
the real markets, various imperfections exist and this theory becomes highly debatable. 
Researchers, indeed, propose a range of leading dividend theories (e.g., the signalling, 
agency cost and tax preference theories) dealing with the presence of the various market 
frictions. However, none of these theories explain the dividend puzzle single-handedly.  
Empirical research regarding dividend policy is extensive. Especially, studies 
conducted in developed markets, where the major theories are originally formulated, have 
provided voluminous evidence on the divided debate. Although some explanations (e.g., the 
Lintner or Rozeff models) have been strongly supported by many scholars, no general 
consensus has yet been reached despite countless research. Consequently, our paper 
shows that the actual motivation for paying dividends is still unsolved and remains as a 
puzzle. Additionally, empirical evidence related to developing (emerging) markets is 
relatively limited compared to the developed markets. With the growing importance in terms 
of global equity investments, developing countries have recently started attracting 
international investors at a considerable level. Along with the fact that emerging markets 
generally differ from developed markets in many aspects (such as, ownership structures, 
poorer laws and regulations, weaker corporate governance, and political, social and financial 
stability) and the debate on dividend policy is still inconclusive, there is no doubt that 
emerging markets add more to the dividend puzzle. In fact, a growing number of studies have 
started to examine the relationship between ownership structure (e.g., families, institutional investors 
and the state), corporate governance (e.g., board size, board independence and CEO duality) and 
dividend policy in the context of emerging markets. For example, various cross-country studies, such 
as Mitton (2004) – 19 developing countries from Latin America and Asia to Europe, Abor and Fiador 
(2013) – four emerging markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Mehdi et al. (2017) –  362 firms from East 
Asia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and single-country studies, such as Abdelsalam et al. 
(2008) in Egypt, Bokpin (2011) in Ghana, Setiawan and Phua (2013) in Indonesia, Benjamin and Zain 
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(2015) in Malaysia and Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) in Turkey, have all documented the effect of 
ownership structure and/or corporate governance on dividend payment decisions. 
Thus, we argue that dividend policy remains a continuing puzzle and subject to much 
criticism based on the various factors, including tackled imperfection, market conditions or 
the methodology adopted. It is also worth noting that some recent explanations of the 
dividend policy relate to the considerations such as the catering theory, firm life-cycle 
(maturity) and behavioural finance (e.g., investor preferences) but whether such 
explanations help in solving the puzzle or adding more complexity to the debate is a topic 
worth to investigate. 
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Table 1. Summary of Empirical Studies of Signalling Theory 
Panel A: Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model 
Author(s) Model Examined Country Sample Sample Period Method(s) Empirical Results 
Darling (1957) 
Modifications of the 
Lintner Model  
U.S. 
Ranged from 88 to 
265 industrial firms 
1921‒1955 Multiple-regression 
There is substantial empirical 
evidence supporting Lintner’s 
partial adjustment model of 
signalling theory and reporting 
consistency of Lintner’s results 
across different period of time 
and methods in developed 
markets. 
Fama and Babiak (1968) U.S. 392 industrial firms 1946‒1964 
OLS regression and 
simulations 
McDonald et al. (1975) France 75 firms 1962‒1968 
OLS and 2SLS 
regressions 
Chateau (1979) Canada 
40 manufacturing 
firms 
1947‒1970 
OLS, OLSH-L, IV, QGLS 
and ALS regressions 
Dewenter and Warther 
(1998) 
U.S. and 
Japan 
313 U.S. and 180 
Japanese firms 
1983‒1992 
OLS and logit 
regressions, and 
Wilcoxon test 
Baker et al. (1985) 
Survey-based 
research 
U.S. 318 usable responses  1983 Postal survey 
Pruitt and Gitman (1991) U.S. 114 usable responses  1988 Postal survey 
Baker et al. (2002) U.S. 188 usable responses  1999 Postal survey 
Brav et al. (2005) U.S. 
384 usable responses 
and 23 interviews  
2002 
Postal survey and in-
depth interview  
Ranged from 89 to 
244 firms  
1950‒2002 Multiple-regression 
Baker et al. (2006) Norway 33 usable responses 2004 Postal survey 
Baker et al. (2008) Canada 103 usable responses 2005 Postal survey 
Baker and Powell (2012) Indonesia 52 usable responses 2009 Postal survey 
There is evidence supporting 
the Lintner model in explaining 
dividend behaviour in different 
emerging markets in where they 
generally have higher 
adjustment factors; hence, lower 
smoothing and less stable 
dividend policies compared to 
developed countries. 
Baker and Kapoor (2015) India 42 usable responses 2013 Postal survey 
Baker et al. (2018) Turkey 57 usable responses 2015 E-mail survey 
Mookerjee (1992)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modifications of the 
Lintner model 
India Private sector firms 1950‒1981 OLS regression 
Pandey (2001) Malaysia 248 industrial firms  1993‒2000 
Pooled OLS and panel 
(fixed and random 
effects, and logit) 
regressions 
Al-Najjar (2009) Jordan 86 non-financial firms  1994‒2003 
Pool and panel OLS, 
logit and tobit, and 
fixed and random 
effects regressions  
Chemmanur et al. (2010) U.S. and Hong 618 U.S. and 156 1984‒2002 Time series regression  
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Kong Hong Kong firms  
Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan 
(2017) 
Turkey 264 industrial firms 2003‒2012 
Pooled OLS and 
system GMM 
Adaoglu (2000) Turkey  76 non-financial firms  1985‒1997 
Pool and panel OLS, 
logit and tobit, and 
fixed and random 
effects regressions  
The Lintner model does not 
work very well for emerging 
market firms since current 
dividends are much less 
sensitive to past dividends in 
these markets. Aivazian et al. (2003) 
Eight emerging 
markets and 
U.S. 
The largest firms from 
eight emerging 
markets and 100 U.S. 
firms  
1980‒1990 Pooled OLS 
Panel B: Studies of the Information Content of Dividends Hypothesis 
Author(s) 
Type of 
Announcements 
Country Sample Sample Period 
Event Study Time 
Period
†
 and Method 
Empirical Results 
Aharony and Swary 
(1980) 
Dividend changes  U.S. 
 
2,612 events from 
149 firms 
 
1963‒1976 
Days (−10 to +10), 
SMM 
There are studies report  
evidence from both developed 
and emerging markets that 
indicates managers have prior 
inside information about their 
firm’s future financial 
performance and thus they use 
cash dividend announcements 
(increases/decreases and/or 
initiations/omissions) to convey 
changes in their expectations 
about the firm. 
Healy and Palepu (1988) 
Dividend initiations 
and omissions  
U.S. 
 
131 initiating and 172 
omitting firms 
 
1969‒1980 
Days (−60 to + 20) and 
Years (−5 to +4), MAR, 
regression analysis 
Michaely et al. (1995) 
Dividend initiations 
and omissions  
U.S. 
 
561 initiating and 887 
omitting events 
 
1964‒1988 
Days (−254 to +758), 
MAR 
Akhigbe and Madura 
(1996) 
Dividend initiations 
and omissions  
U.S. 
 
128 initiating and 299 
omitting events 
 
1972‒1990 
Months (+1 to +36), 
BSAR 
Lipson et al. (1998) Dividend initiations  U.S. 
 
99 initiating and 99 
non-initiating newly-
listed, and 99 size-
matched dividend 
paying firms 
 
1980‒1990 
Days (−1 to +10) and 
Years (−1 to +2), MAR, 
RW, IGA and SGA 
Altiok-Yilmaz and Akben-
Selcuk (2010) 
Dividend changes  Turkey  
184 events from 46 
firms 
2005‒2008 
Days (−360 to +1), 
SMM 
Dasilas and Leventis 
(2011) 
Dividend changes  Greece  231 events 2000‒2004 
Days (−220 to +120), 
SMM 
Al-Yahyaee (2011) Dividend changes  Oman  501 events 1997‒2005 Days (−250 to +5), 
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SMM and MAR 
Jensen and Johnson 
(1995) 
Dividend decreases 
and omissions  
U.S. 
268 events from 242 
firms  
1974‒1989 
Years (−3 to +2), 
Wilcoxon test  
However, there are other 
studies conducted in different 
markets (both developed and 
emerging) provide evidence 
inconsistent with the information 
hypothesis of dividends, 
claiming that dividend policy 
change announcements do not 
necessarily signal about the 
future earnings changes of 
firms. 
DeAngelo et al. (1996) Dividend changes  U.S. 145 firms 1980‒1987 
Years (−10 to +3), RW 
and IGA 
Benartzi et al. (1997) Dividend changes  U.S. 
 
7,186 events from 
1,025 firms 
 
1979‒1991 
Years (−5 to +3), 
Categorical analysis 
and MAR 
Fairchild et al. (2014) Dividend changes  Thailand  
 
618 events from 287 
firms 
 
1996‒2009 
Years (−1 to +2), 
Benchmark and 
regression analyses 
Liu and Chen (2015) Dividend changes  U.S. 15,321 events 1979‒2011 
Years (−2 to +2), OLS 
and 2SLS 
Notes: OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; 2SLS: Two-stage Least Squares, OLSH-L: Ordinary Least Squares corrected Hildreth-Lu; IV: Instrumental Variable; QGLS: Quasi-
generalised Least Squares; ALS: Augmented Least Squares; SMM: Simple Market Model; MAR: Market Adjusted Returns; BSAR: Beta and Size Adjusted Returns; RW: 
Random-walk Model; IGA: Income-growth-adjusted Model; SGA: Sales-growth-adjusted Model; GMM: Generalised Method of Moments. †Event Study Time Period 
compounds pre-event, event date and post-event time periods. 
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Table 2. Summary of Empirical Studies of Agency Cost Theory 
Panel A: Studies of the Principal-Agent Conflict  
Author(s) Argument Country Sample Sample Period Method(s) Empirical Results 
 
Crutchley and Hansen 
(1989) 
 
Monitoring role of 
dividends 
U.S. 603 industrial firms 1981‒1985 
OLS cross-sectional 
regression 
There is strong evidence that 
dividend policy may play a role 
in controlling the conflicts of 
interest between principals and 
agents by facilitating primary 
capital market monitoring on 
firms’ activities and 
performance, as proposed by 
Easterbrook (1984). As well, 
there is evidence that dividends 
can be used as substitutes with 
other alternative control devices, 
such as insider ownership, 
leverage and growth. 
Born and Rimbey (1993) U.S. 490 firms 1962‒1989 
Event study and cross-
sectional regression 
analyses 
Hansen et al. (1994) U.S. 
 
81 electric utilities in 
1985 and 70 electric 
utilities in 1990 
 
1981‒1985 
1986‒1990 
Comparison analysis 
and OLS cross-
sectional regression 
Noronha et al. (1996) U.S. 341 industrial firms 1986‒1988 
 
OLS and 3SLS 
regressions 
 
 
Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989) 
 
Free cash flow 
hypothesis 
U.S. 
429 substantial 
dividend changes 
1979‒1984 Event study 
There is evidence supporting 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash 
hypothesis in order to explain 
dividend policy decisions. 
However, since both agency 
cost of free cash flow and 
signalling hypotheses imply 
relatively similar effects on 
share prices, studies cannot 
completely rule out the cash 
flow signalling hypothesis. 
Hence, empirical evidence on 
this area is quite mixed. 
Agrawal and Jayaraman 
(1994) 
U.S. 
 
71 industry-sized 
matched pairs of all-
equity and levered 
firms 
 
1979‒1983 
Comparison analysis 
and OLS cross-
sectional regression 
Johnson (1995) U.S. 
129 straight debt 
offerings 
1977‒1983 
 
Event study, 
comparison analysis 
and WLS 
 
Lloyd et al. (1985) 
Modifications of the 
cost minimisation 
model 
U.S. 957 industrial firms  1984 
 
OLS cross-sectional 
regression 
 
 
There is strong evidence in 
favour of the cost minimisation 
model developed by Rozeff 
(1982), which combines 
transaction costs and agency 
costs to an optimal dividend 
 
Schooley and Barney 
(1994) 
 
U.S. 235 industrial firms  1980 
OLS cross-sectional 
regression 
30 
 
 
Moh’d et al. (1995) 
 
U.S. 341 industrial firms  1972‒1989 WLS 
policy. Empirical research 
reports findings consistent with 
Rozeff’s original findings and 
indicates a relationship between 
dividend policy and agency cost 
variables. 
 
 
Farinha (2003) 
 
U.K. 
693 firms in 1991 and 
609 firms in 1996. 
1987‒1991 
1992‒1996 
OLS cross-sectional 
regression 
Panel B: Studies of the Principal-Principal conflict 
Author(s) Argument  Country Sample Sample Period Method(s) Empirical Results 
La Porta et al. (2000) 
Outcome and 
substitute models  
33 different 
countries  
4,103 firms  1989‒1994 
 
Comparison analysis 
and cross-sectional 
regression with country 
random effects 
 
There is increasing evidence 
that concentrated ownership by 
large controlling shareholders 
(typically, families) is the 
dominant form of ownership 
structure in emerging markets, 
which indicates that the salient 
agency problem may therefore 
be expropriation of the wealth of 
minority owners by the 
controlling shareholders in these 
markets. Indeed, empirical 
research reveals that agency 
cost theory of dividends needs 
to be uniquely investigated in 
emerging markets and, more 
importantly, the ownership 
structure of the firms in these 
markets should specifically be 
taken into account while 
identifying the proxies for 
agency cost problems.  
 
Faccio et al. (2001) 
Ownership structure 
effect  
Five West 
European and 
nine Asian 
countries  
5,897 firms 1992‒1996 
Comparison analysis 
and OLS cross-
sectional regression 
Manos (2002) 
A modification of 
the cost 
minimisation model 
India 
661 non-financial 
firms 
2001 
OLS, tobit, and 
Heckman’s two step  
regressions 
Chen et al. (2005) 
Family ownership 
effect  
Hong Kong  412 firms 1995‒1998 
Pooled OLS, industry-
fixed and firm-fixed 
effects regressions 
Wei et al. (2011) Family control effect  China  1,486 firms 2004‒2008 
Logit and tobit 
regressions 
Gonzalez et al. (2014) 
Family involvement 
influence  
Colombia  458 firms 1996‒2006 
Random effects probit 
and cross-sectional 
tobit regressions 
Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan 
(2016) 
Ownership structure 
effect  
Turkey  264 industrial firms  2003‒2012 
Pooled and random 
effects (panel) logit and 
tobit regressions 
Panel C: Studies of the Shareholder-Bondholder Conflict 
Author(s) Argument  Country Sample Sample Period Method(s) Empirical Results 
Woolridge (1983) 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. 
 
367 unexpected 
dividend changes 
 
1971‒1977 Event study and CPRA 
 
 
No evidence that firms use 
dividends to transfer wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders. Jayaraman and Shastri U.S.  1962‒1982 Event study and cross-
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(1988) Wealth transfer 
or 
information content 
2,023 specially 
designated dividends 
 
sectional regression Hence, the information content 
hypothesis dominates the 
wealth transfer hypothesis. 
 
Long et al. (1994) U.S. 
 
141 straight and 78 
convertible bonds 
 
1964‒1977 Comparison analysis 
Tsai and Wu (2015) U.S. 
5,571 dividend 
announcements 
2005‒2012 
 
Event study, 
comparison and 
regression analyses 
 
Although it cannot rule out the 
information content hypothesis 
completely, there is still 
evidence of a tendency to 
redistribute wealth in favour of 
shareholders. 
Dhillon and Johnson 
(1994) 
U.S. 131 dividend changes 1970‒1987 
 
Event study and 
comparison analysis 
 
Mathur et al. (2013) U.S. 
6,682 firm-year 
observations 
1970‒2005 Regression analysis 
Notes: OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; 3SLS: Three-stage Least Squares; WLS: Weighted Least Squares; CPRA: Comparison Period Return Approach. 
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Table 3. Summary of Empirical Studies of Tax Effect 
Panel A: Studies of the Relationship between Dividend Yields and Risk-Adjusted Returns  
Author(s) Model Examined Country Sample Sample Period Method(s) Empirical Results 
 
Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979; 
1982) 
 
The CAPM and 
its variations 
U.S. 
New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) 
stocks 
1936‒1977 
Cross-sectional (using 
OLS, GLS and MLE) 
regressions  
 
Investors require higher pre-tax risk 
adjusted returns on stocks with 
higher dividend yields to 
compensate the tax disadvantages 
of these returns when dividends are 
taxed at higher rates than capital 
gains, consistent with the tax effect 
hypothesis. 
 
Poterba and Summers 
(1984) 
U.K. 3,500 British firms 1955‒1981 GLS 
 
 
 
 
Black and Scholes 
(1974) 
 
 
 
 
U.S. 
25 investment 
portfolios from NYSE 
stocks   
1936‒1966 
Cross-sectional and 
time-series regressions 
 
There is no relationship between 
dividend yields and stock returns. 
Because, not all investors are taxed 
at the same rate and those investors 
will invest in companies with cash 
dividend policies suitable for their 
tax situation. Since clienteles exist 
for low and high dividend policies, 
companies cannot increase their 
values by reducing taxes through 
their dividend policies. Hence, the 
evidence shows no support for a tax 
effect but is consistent with the tax 
clientele hypothesis. 
 
Miller and Scholes (1982) U.S. NYSE stocks 1940‒1978 
Cross-sectional and 
time-series regressions 
Blume (1980) U.S. NYSE stocks 1936‒1976 
 
Cross-sectional 
regression 
 
 
 
 
 
There is evidence of a yield-tax 
effect but this is not entirely 
consistent with the tax effect 
hypothesis since non-tax factors 
exist for the yield effect. Hence, 
although taxes explain part of the 
positive relationship between yields 
and stock returns, the relation 
across stocks is far too complicated 
to be fully explained by tax effect. 
Keim (1985) U.S. 
Ranged from 429 to 
1,289 NYSE firms 
1931‒1978 
 
Cross-sectional and 
time-series regressions 
 
Kalay and Michaely 
(2000) 
U.S. NYSE stocks  1936‒1988 
 
Cross-sectional (using 
OLS, GLS and MLE) 
and time-series 
regressions 
 
Park and Kim (2010) Korea Ranged from 457 to 2000‒2008 
 
Cross-sectional and 
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534 firms time-series regressions 
 
 
Lemmon and Nguyen 
(2015) 
Hong Kong 1,092 firms  1981‒2010 
 
Cross-sectional and 
time-series regressions 
 
Panel B: Studies of the Ex-Dividend Day Share Behaviour 
Author(s) 
Parameter 
Examined 
Country Sample Sample Period Method(s) Empirical Results 
Elton and Gruber (1970) 
Ex-dividend 
price drop 
compared to 
dividend per 
share 
U.S. 4,148 observations 1966‒1967 
Event study and 
Spearman’s rank test 
 
There is evidence that taxes are 
important determinants of the firms’ 
payout decisions, suggesting that 
taxation affects significantly ex-
dividend day share price behaviour 
and shareholders in a higher tax 
brackets have a tax-induced 
preference for capital gains over 
dividend income, compared to those 
in lower tax brackets. 
 
Kaplanis (1986) U.K. 
360 options on 14 
different shares 
1979‒1984 
Event study, OLS, GLS 
and MLE 
Lasfer (1995) U.K. 10,123 observations 1985‒1994 
Event study, 
comparison analysis 
and regressions 
Bell and Jenkinson 
(2002) 
U.K. 9,673 observations 1995‒1999 
Event study and OLS 
regression 
Milonas et al. (2006) China  317 observations  1996‒1998 
Event study and 
comparison analysis 
Kalay (1982) U.S. 2,540 observations 1966‒1967 
 
Event study and 
Spearman rank test 
 
 
In the presence of short-term 
traders, the marginal tax rates of the 
shareholders cannot be inferred by 
observing ex-dividend day share 
price drops. Because, short-term 
traders such as tax-neutral dealers 
and corporate traders, who are 
seeking for arbitrage profits, 
dominate the price setting on the ex-
days. 
 
Michaely (1991) U.S. 18,389 observations 1986‒1989 
 
Event study, OLS, GLS 
and Fisher sign test 
 
Koski and Scruggs 
(1998) 
Trading volume 
around ex-days 
U.S. 70 observations 1990‒1991 
Event study, 
comparison analysis 
and OLS regression 
Rantapuska (2008) Finland  885 observations 1995‒2002 
Event study, probit, 
logit and Heckman’s 
two-step regressions 
 
All types of investors may take 
advantage of the differences in tax 
rates and engage in arbitrage 
opportunities around ex-days, which 
supports dynamic clientele 
hypothesis. 
 
Tseng and Hu (2013) Thailand  559 observations 1996‒2005 
Event study, 
comparison analysis 
and OLS regression 
Notes: CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; GLS: Generalised Least Squares; MLE: Maximum Likelihood Estimator. 
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APPENDIX A: M&M’s Proof of Dividend Irrelevancy  
M&M (1961) illustrate their argument behind their theorem as below:  
 
                                                                               D1 + (P1 – P0) 
                                                                    r =                                                                                                       (1) 
                                                                          P0 
 
Where r is the rate of return; P0 is the current market price of the share when the investor buys it and P1 
is the expected market price when the investor sells it; D1 is the dividend per share paid over this period. 
Accordingly, the rate of return on the share equals the dividend income plus the capital gain of selling this share, 
all divided by the price of the share at the beginning of the period. Re-organising Equation (1), we can measure 
the current market price of the share as: 
 
                                                                                      D1 + P 
                                                                          P0 =                                                                                               (2) 
                                                                                       (1 + r) 
                 
Now, if we suppose that n is the number of shares outstanding at time zero, the current market value of 
the firm (MV0) is:  
 
                                                                             nD1 + nP1 
                                                                  MV0 = nP0 =                                                                                          (3) 
                                                                               (1 + r) 
 
In order to prove that dividends are irrelevant under the assumptions of perfect capital market, M&M 
employ the sources and uses of funds equation. The firm’s sources of funds are the cash flows from operations 
(CF1) and the new equity financing during any given period (mP1), where m is the number of new shares issued 
at time one and sold at the ex-dividend closing price P1. The uses of funds are the dividend payments (nD1) and 
investment opportunities (I1) taken in the same time interval. As the sources must equal the uses of the funds, 
therefore: 
              
                                                                        CF1 + mP1 = nD1 + I1                                                                      (4) 
 
Once Equation (4) is re-arranged: 
 
                                                                         nD1 = CF1 + mP1 ‒ I1                                                                      (5) 
   
              Re-placing Equation (5) into Equation (3) for nD1 will give us:  
      CF1 + mP1 – I1 + nP1                     CF1 – I1 + (n+m)P1 
                                MV0 =                                                   =                                                                                 (6)                              
                                                              (1 + r)                                           (1 + r) 
 
Knowing that (n+m)P1 = MV1, thus; 
 
                                                                              CF1 – I1 + MV1 
                                                              MV0 =                                                                                                        (7) 
                                                                                    (1 + r) 
  
Since dividend payments do not appear in Equation (7) and given that operating cash flows (CF1), 
investments (I1) and rate of return (r) are not functions of dividend policy, the market value of the firm is not 
dependent of its current dividend policy. Therefore, the analysis suggests that the firm’s investment policy is the 
key determinant of its value and dividend policy is residual. Furthermore, the analysis can be carried over to more 
periods and the results will remain the same; that is the value of the firm is not affected by dividend policy. Also, 
the analysis above completely based on 100% equity financing. It can be extended to contain debt financing. 
However, the inclusion of debt financing does not affect the results. Similar to the equity-financed dividends, no 
additional value is created by debt-financed dividends under the assumptions of perfect capital market (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961). 
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